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WHO WAS WATCHING WHOM?
A REASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN GERMANICUS AND PISO
Fred K. Drogula


Abstract. Despite Tacitus’ insinuations to the contrary, Cn. Calpurnius Piso (cos.
7 b.c.e.) was no friend and loyal supporter of Emperor Tiberius. The emperor
offered Piso the command of Syria in an effort to win over the political support
of this prestigious-but-recalcitrant senator. As a safeguard should Piso attempt
something treacherous in this powerful command, Tiberius gave Piso the province
at a time when Germanicus Caesar—the emperor’s loyal adopted son and heir—
would be in the East resolving a number of economic problems in the eastern
provinces. Thus Piso was not sent to watch the prince, but to be watched by him.

Of all the Roman senators who held provincial commands
in the early empire, few are more famous and better documented than
Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso (cos. 7 b.c.e.), the proconsul of Syria who gained
notoriety for his conflict with Germanicus Caesar, the nephew, adopted
son, and heir-apparent of the reigning emperor Tiberius. Germanicus was
holding supreme command over the Roman East with imperium maius
from 17 to 19 c.e., but Piso was openly insubordinate and treated the
prince with great disrespect. Although Germanicus endured this behavior
for a while, he finally asserted his superior authority and humbled the
proconsul, driving Piso to abandon his Syrian command altogether. When
the prince died from illness shortly afterwards, Piso had the audacity to
rejoice publicly at his death and tried to reclaim possession of Syria by
force, raising a ragtag army and starting a civil war that was quickly crushed
by the Roman legions under the command of Germanicus’ lieutenants.
Forced to return to Rome, Piso was accused of many crimes, including
poisoning the prince, and he took his own life when his condemnation
seemed certain. Tacitus reports this infamous conflict between the prince
and Piso in his Annales (2.43.1–3.19.2), but the discovery of the senatus
consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre—the official senatorial record of Piso’s
trial and punishment—has made Piso a particularly interesting subject
of inquiry to historians because it provides both a corroboration of TaciAmerican Journal of Philology 136 (2015) 121–153 © 2015 by Johns Hopkins University Press

122

FRED K. DROGULA

tus’ account and new information not found there.1 Because the senatus
consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre (henceforth, SCPP) complements and
expands upon Tacitus’ description of Piso’s trial and posthumous punishment, modern scholars have recently focused their research on what
happened to Piso after he returned to Rome from his command in Syria.2
This article will address a different topic that is not well explained
by the SCPP: why was Piso chosen for the Syrian command in the first
place? At first glance, this question seems easily answered, since Tacitus
clearly wishes his readers to believe that Tiberius chose Piso as an agent
and co-conspirator in a plan to suppress Germanicus’ popularity and
ambitions, and perhaps even to kill the young prince (Tac. Ann. 2.43.2–6,
2.77.3, and 3.16.1). Although modern scholars generally dismiss part of
Tacitus’ conspiracy theory—the suggestion that Tiberius wished to harm
his adopted son—it is still widely accepted that Piso was the trusted friend
and agent of the emperor, and that Tiberius sent Piso to Syria to keep
an eye on Germanicus and to prevent the prince from taking any rash
action (such as invading Parthia).3 Yet this position rests on startlingly
weak evidence—mainly on Tacitus’ inclusion of unfounded rumors and
unsupported (and even misleading) innuendos in his work. The weakness
of this evidence is disturbing, especially since—if one looks past these
shadowy hints of conspiracy—there is a great deal of evidence in Tacitus’
text that refutes the insinuation that Piso was a friend and agent of the
emperor. Thus Tacitus presents his readers with a contradiction, since
his innuendo that Piso was Tiberius’ friend and agent seems disproven
by his clear statements that Piso held the emperor in low regard and
wanted nothing to do with the imperial house. Piso was so obviously a
bad choice as governor of Syria that only a secret conspiracy can provide
a plausible motive for Tiberius’ choice, but Tacitus undermines even this
possibility by giving ample evidence that Tiberius had no reason to trust
Piso or choose him as a co-conspirator. Something in Tacitus’ account
of this affair is not right, and it centers on why Piso was selected for the
governorship of Syria.
1
On the discovery and text of the senatus consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre, see Eck
et al. 1996. For additional commentary, including references to scholarly work since the
1996 publication by Eck et al., see Lott 2012, 254–311. For an English translation of the
senatus consultum, see Meyer 1998.
2
See recent work, including Griffin 1997; Richardson 1997; Barnes 1998; Cooley 1998;
Flower 1998; Bodel 1999; Damon 1999; Flower 1999; González 1999; Lebek 1999; Potter
1999; Talbert 1999; Severy 2000; Eck 2002; MacKay 2003; Fishwick 2007.
3
E.g., see Syme 1939, 424; 1986, 373; Shotter 1974, 231; Levick 1999, 154; Rapke 1982;
Bird 1987; Wells 1992, 100; Shotter 2004, 27, 41–42; Seager 2005, 37–38; Robinson 2007, 70.
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Tacitus demonstrates clearly that Piso was no loyal friend and
supporter of the emperor, so another motive is needed to explain his
appointment to the governorship of Syria. The evidence suggests a very
good explanation: Tiberius hoped to win over Piso’s political support by
offering him the highly desirable, status-enhancing command of Syria.
In doing this, Tiberius was following the example of Augustus, who had
sought to win over the support of nobiles and to use their Republican
names and auctoritas to unify the state and to adorn and legitimize his
rule. Cn. Piso was a particularly prestigious nobilis with a solid Republican
pedigree, but his support for Tiberius was tepid at best, and he had even
criticized the emperor publicly before the senate. Since Tiberius was still
new as emperor and had encountered difficulties upon his succession,
winning over the influential Piso with the inducement of a desirable
province was a shrewd political tactic. There was some risk in giving this
unpredictable senator command over the powerful army in Syria, but
Tiberius had a safeguard: his adopted son and heir Germanicus was to
be given an extraordinary command in the East to deal with a range of
important fiscal and administrative problems.4 This would allow Piso to
govern Syria with a free hand, but Germanicus would be close enough to
observe the governor’s actions and to intercede if he detected treachery.
Despite Tacitus’ efforts to portray Tiberius as jealous or fearful of his
nephew, the emperor had no reason to doubt Germanicus’ loyalty, and
in fact he had good grounds to expect that the prince would defend the
imperial house against any challenge by Piso. Although the personalities
of the two men ultimately led to open conflict, it may nevertheless have
been the case that Piso was sent to Syria not to watch Germanicus, but
rather to be watched by the prince.
Piso is not merely interesting as a governor because his activities
are so well documented; he is interesting because he was an incredibly
bad choice for the governorship of Syria—probably the worst choice
Tiberius ever made for a provincial command. His shortcomings became
obvious immediately: en route to Syria, he denounced Germanicus in a

4
A similar suggestion was first proposed by Beesly 1878, 125–26, and reiterated and
expanded upon by Rapke 1982. In their view, the empress Livia Augusta—who was a good
friend of Piso’s wife Plancina—prevailed upon her son Tiberius to give Piso the Syrian
command. This idea seems implausible, however, because Piso’s disrespectful, insubordinate, and even hostile behavior towards members of the imperial house undermines the
possibility that he recognized them as his patrons or benefactors. Not once did Piso act
like a man who had received a favor from the emperor. Rather, he acted like a man who
believed himself robbed of things due to him.
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fiery speech to the Athenians, he was ungrateful when the prince saved
his life during a storm at sea, he relaxed the discipline of the legions and
tampered with their loyalty to the emperor, he ignored or disobeyed
direct orders from Germanicus, he showed the prince open contempt and
disrespect at public functions, and he even countermanded the orders
given by the prince to the legions and cities in Syria (SCPP 38, 52–53;
Tac. Ann. 2.53.3, 55.1–6, 57.1–4, 69.1). When Germanicus finally asserted
his greater authority over the arrogant governor, Piso decided to abandon his province rather than fulfill his responsibilities as governor (Tac.
Ann. 2.69.1–2).5 When the prince grew ill and died a short time later,
Piso rejoiced publicly at the news and tried to reclaim the governorship
of Syria forcibly by starting a civil war against Germanicus’ lieutenant
Cn. Sentius Saturninus (SCPP 37, 45, 57–62; Tac. Ann. 2.69.1–2, 75.2,
78.1–81.3). When his insurrection was crushed and he returned to Rome,
he held celebrations during a period of mourning for the emperor’s son
(Tac. Ann. 3.9.2–3). Even allowing for some exaggeration by Tacitus,
Piso was clearly a terrible choice for the command of Syria, which begs
the question of why such a disrespectful and insubordinate senator was
selected for the command of Syria in the first place.
Tacitus had an answer to this conundrum: Piso was an agent of the
emperor and in league with him against Germanicus. Of course, he avoids
making this claim in his own voice. Whereas he freely records other of
Tiberius’ (alleged) crimes as simple facts,6 Tacitus keeps his references to
this supposed plot between Tiberius and Piso vague and equivocal, and
relies almost entirely upon hearsay and rumors to convince his readers.
He writes, for example, that Piso “had no doubt” that he had been given
5
Tacitus reports a rumor (Ann. 2.70.2–3) that Germanicus ordered Piso out of the
province, but this is contradicted by the SCPP (28–29, 47–49), by Suetonius (Cal. 3.3), and
by Tacitus himself (Ann. 2.69.1). The SCPP in particular blames Piso for abandoning his
province, which suggests that Piso was unable to offer any justification for this action, such
as having been ordered out of the province by Germanicus. Goodyear 1981, 2.407–8, 427,
believes that Germanicus probably dismissed Piso, since otherwise Germanicus’ lieutenants
would not have been able legally to prevent Piso from returning to Syria after the prince’s
death, but this assumes Germanicus’ friends acted in accordance with the letter of the
law. Since Germanicus’ friends had long hated Piso (Tac. Ann. 2.57.2), and they may have
believed that Piso had poisoned the prince (Tac. Ann. 2.71.1), it would be unsurprising if
they ignored Piso’s legal claim to the province.
6
Cf. Tacitus’ clear and straightforward report of Tiberius’ complicity in the death
of Postumus Agrippa (Ann. 1.6.1–3): “The first act of the new principate was the slaughter
of Postumus Agrippa . . . [Tiberius] was pretending there were orders from his father . . .
[Tiberius and Livia] had speeded the slaughter of a suspected and resented young man.”
I use Woodman’s translation of Tacitus throughout this article.
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Syria in order to frustrate Germanicus’ ambitions, and that “certain people
believed” the emperor had given Piso secret instructions to work against
the prince, and that “without doubt” the empress Livia (Tiberius’ mother)
had instructed Piso’s wife Plancina to attack Germanicus’ wife Agrippina
“in womanly rivalry.”7 Tacitus also makes Piso’s friend Domitius Celer
claim in a private conversation that Piso had the support and complicity
of Tiberius and Livia, and Tacitus later reports that older generations
spoke of a document in Piso’s possession proving that Piso was following the emperor’s orders, although he pointedly declines to assert the
veracity of this rumor himself (Ann. 2.77.3, 3.16.1; see Suet. Tib. 52.3).
While this repetition of rumor and hearsay seems substantial, none of it
amounts to reliable evidence on the nature of Piso’s assignment; rumor
was a common literary device in ancient authors, and many scholars have
written on Tacitus’ use of rumor and innuendo to guide or manipulate
his reader’s understanding of events, including his use of rumors to create impressions or provide unverifiable evidence.8 Thus Tacitus reports
(Ann. 3.2.3, 11.2) that the nameless mob suspected Tiberius’ guilt in the
death of Germanicus, but this tells us nothing except that a particular
rumor—which may or may not have been accurate—may have been
floating around a city that was full of rumors. This environment of rumor
and uncertainty gives us a good impression of what life in imperial Rome
may have been like, but on their own such rumors cannot be taken as
convincing evidence of Tiberius’ guilt. Our hesitance to accept such flimsy
evidence should be increased by our knowledge that Tacitus was not a
neutral reporter; it is well known that he disliked Tiberius and sought to
vilify him using unsubstantiated rumors and innuendos, and in particular
that he intentionally contrasted the older emperor with the youthful,

7
Ann. 2.43.4–6: nec dubium habebat se delectum qui Syriae imponeretur ad spes
Germanici coercendas. Credidere quidam data et a Tiberio occulta mandata; et Plancinam
haud dubie Augusta monuit aemulatione muliebri Agrippinam insectandi (“nor did he have
any doubt that he had been selected for installation in Syria to curb Germanicus’ hopes.
Certain people believed that secret instructions had been given to him by Tiberius; and
without doubt Augusta warned Plancina in womanly rivalry to assail Agrippina.”). See
Goodyear 1981, 2.324.
8
Hardie 2012, 284–313, passim gives a good and recent discussion of rumor as a
literary device in ancient writers, including a discussion of Tacitus’ use of rumor. On his
use of rumor and innuendo to guide or manipulate his reader’s perception of events, see:
Ryberg 1942; Mierow 1943, 153–55; Shatzman 1974; Sullivan 1975–6; Whitehead 1979;
Develin 1983; Gibson 1998. Goodyear 1981, 2.325, simply dismisses most of Tacitus’ innuendos, and Woodman and Martin 1996, 117, discuss how Tacitus obfuscates information
that appears clear in SCPP.
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energetic, and popular Germanicus.9 Although he did not suppress the
prince’s shortcomings, Tacitus went to great lengths to portray Tiberius
as jealous and fearful of his dynamic and well-loved stepson, so it is to
be expected that Tacitus would strive to link the emperor to the man
accused of the prince’s death.10 Whether or not Piso was actually guilty
of murder, his villainy had been pronounced by the senate and publicized
throughout the empire by the SCPP. Linking Tiberius in friendship and in
conspiracy to the disgraced and hated Piso was one more way for Tacitus
to attack the character of the emperor, but his dependence upon rumor
and innuendo to insinuate this link indicates that no better evidence
existed. There is, therefore, little reason to believe Tacitus’ insinuation
of a conspiracy in the first place, and further examination reveals good
grounds for rejecting the idea.
Beyond the heavy use of rumor and hearsay, the impression that
Piso was an agent of the emperor, and that he had been selected because
he could oppose Germanicus, emerges primarily from the way Tacitus
describes the provincial commands assigned to Germanicus and Piso in
17 c.e. (Ann. 2.42.2–43.6). In Tacitus’ presentation of the events, a number
of serious organizational and economic problems in the East required the
attention of a member of the imperial house, so—at Tiberius’ request—
the senate assigned to Germanicus a broad command that comprised all
the provinces “across the sea” (that is, east of the Adriatic) and greater
imperium than any other commander except the emperor, whose imperium remained the greatest.11 This special assignment for a member of
the imperial family was not unusual; Augustus had frequently sent men

9
Ann. 1.33.1–3, where Tiberius is shown in a very negative light when compared to
Germanicus, and 1.62.2, where Tacitus suggests that Tiberius may have interpreted everything Germanicus did—no matter how noble—in a negative light.
10
Germanicus is portrayed as having great difficulty restoring the discipline in rebellious legions in 14 c.e. (Ann. 1.34.1–52.3), and the description of his German campaigns
the following year does not hide his tactical mistakes (1.55.2–71.3). The legions try to make
Germanicus emperor (1.31.1, 35.3); Germanicus was the greatest threat to Tiberius’ accession (1.7.6–7); Tiberius was afraid of Germanicus (1.52.1). Kelly 2010, 231, gives a good
summary of modern views about Tacitus’ representation of Germanicus in the Annales.
11
Ann. 2.42.2–43.1; SCPP 31–36. The kingdom of Cappadocia had just been incorporated into the Roman Empire and needed to be organized and subjected to a new tax;
the kings of Commagene and Cilicia had died and there was uncertainty about how their
kingdoms should be governed in the future (most of the inhabitants wanted Roman rule);
and the provinces of Judaea and Syria were economically distressed and asking for tax
relief. For a discussion of Germanicus’ command, see Koestermann 1958.
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in his family to important commands throughout the empire.12 Immediately after reporting Germanicus’ command, Tacitus next describes Piso’s
assignment to the province of Syria in a way that compels the reader to
interpret his appointment as a direct consequence of Germanicus’ assignment to the East: “But Tiberius had removed from Syria Creticus Silanus,
who was connected with Germanicus by marriage (Silanus’ daughter had
been betrothed to Nero, the eldest of his children), and had placed in
charge Cn. Piso, temperamentally violent and a stranger to compliance,
with the innate defiance of his father . . . he scarcely yielded to Tiberius
and looked down on the man’s children as greatly beneath him.”13 These
words are intended to make the reader assume that Piso’s assignment
was subsequent to—and motivated by—Germanicus’ new command; not
only is the emperor’s choice of Piso for Syria described immediately after
the senate’s conferral of the eastern command on the prince, but Tacitus
also describes Silanus and Piso primarily by their respective relationships with Germanicus: Silanus is identified as a relation (and therefore
a probable supporter) of the young prince, whereas Piso is specifically
described as looking down on Germanicus. By describing these men here
only by their relationship to Germanicus, Tacitus creates the unavoidable
impression that Silanus was removed because he was a relation and ally
of the prince, whereas Piso was appointed as his successor because he
loathed the prince and was certain to be rude and uncooperative. No other
provincial appointments are described here, so Tacitus makes this passage
focus on friends and enemies of Germanicus, rather than on the distribution of provincial commands. Told in this way, Tacitus practically compels
his reader to understand that the change in the Syrian governorship was
a direct consequence of Germanicus’ eastern command, and that it was
done because the emperor wanted the prince’s enemy—rather than a
12
Gaius Caesar was sent to hold command of the Danube in 1 b.c.e. (Dio 55.10.17),
but Augustus soon decided to send him to the East instead, where he died while holding a
wide-ranging command similar to that given to Germanicus (Vell. 2.102.2–3; Tac. Ann. 1.3.3;
Dio 55.10.18). Lucius Caesar was en route to take up a special command in Spain when he
died in 4 c.e. (Vell. 2.102.3; Dio 55.10a.9). Tiberius commanded Rome’s army in Armenia
in 20 b.c.e. (Suet. Aug. 21.3; Tib. 9.1) and its northern armies from 12 to 7 b.c.e., and from
4 to 12 c.e. (Vell. 2.104.3–4; Dio 54.31.3–4, 55.28.5). For discussion, see Seager 2005, 21–37.
13
Tac. Ann. 2.43.2–3: tunc decreto patrum permissae Germanico provinciae quae
mari dividuntur, maiusque imperium, quoquo adisset, quam iis qui sorte aut missu principis obtinerent. Sed Tiberius demoverat Syria Creticum Silanum, per adfinitatem conexum
Germanico, quia Silani filia Neroni vetustissimo liberorum eius pacta erat, praefeceratque
Cn. Pisonem, ingenio violentum et obsequii ignarum . . . vix Tiberio concedere, liberos eius
ut multum infra despectare.
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friend—in command of Syria. Thus the reader is left with no alternative
explanation for Piso’s appointment14 and, therefore, with little choice
but to imagine that Tiberius and Piso were in league together to make
things very difficult for Germanicus in the East, a conception that Tacitus
reinforces with rumors and innuendo.
A closer look at this passage reveals Tacitus’ efforts to plant ideas
of conspiracy in his readers’ minds. In particular, he has manipulated the
sequence of events in this passage to arouse suspicion and imply that Piso
was chosen to oppose the prince. Although Tacitus presents the appointment of Piso as a direct consequence of Germanicus’ receipt of his eastern
command, his use of the pluperfect when describing Piso’s succession
to Silanus demonstrates that Piso had already been assigned to Syria
by the time Tiberius went before the senate to request an extraordinary
command for the prince (“Germanicus was entrusted with the provinces
that are separated by the sea . . . but Tiberius had removed from Syria
Creticus Silanus”).15 Thus Tacitus has reversed the sequence in which
Germanicus and Piso received their provincial commands in his narrative,
no doubt to create a false impression of the motive behind the choice
of Piso. If Tacitus had described the events in their proper chronological
order, with Piso’s assignment to Syria having been made public before
Tiberius asked the senate for a special command for Germanicus, the
reader would receive a very different impression of what had actually
happened. Instead of taking on the appearance of a conspiracy, the two
provincial assignments would barely seem connected: Piso had been made
governor of Syria, and sometime later the prince was sent to resolve a
number of economic problems in various eastern provinces—most of
which had nothing to do with Syria. Whereas Tacitus’ telling of the event
creates confusion and a suspicion of conspiracy (“why did the emperor

14
Thus Seager 2005, 82: “[Silanus’] daughter was betrothed to Germanicus’ eldest
son Nero, and this connection was the only explanation men could find for his supersession
at precisely this time.” Goodyear 1981, 2.324, summarizes it: Silanus “could respectably be
replaced.”
15
Rapke 1982, 61, argues to the contrary that it is impossible to determine the order
of the provincial assignments. Goodyear 1981, 2.324, does not remark on Tacitus’ use of the
pluperfect, but Koestermann 1958, 335–36, seems to accept that Piso’s assignment to Syria
was subsequent to the senate’s conferral of a special eastern command on Germanicus.
McCulloch 1984, 76, observes the use of the pluperfect in this passage and suggests that it
reflects “Tiberius’ careful planning.” This is undoubtedly correct, but McCulloch does not
address why Tacitus distorted the chronology of the provincial assignments in this section,
or the effect this distortion has on the reader’s understanding of the motive behind Piso’s
assignment to Syria.
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send the clearly inappropriate Piso unless there was a plot against the
prince”), the appointment of Germanicus after Piso creates no confusion at all: there were extraordinary problems in the East that required
a member of the imperial house, so the emperor sent his adopted son
and heir with sufficient authority to resolve those problems. In this case,
Silanus’ connection to Germanicus is not even relevant, since his return
to Rome had been ordered before Tiberius requested a special command
for the prince. Silanus had been the governor of Syria for at least six years
when he was recalled to Rome, and after this long term in command, the
appointment of a successor would not have appeared noteworthy, except
that Tacitus manipulated his account of it to make it seem that Silanus was
removed because of his relationship to the prince.16 Naturally, it must be
assumed that Tiberius took the governorship of Syria into consideration
when contemplating Germanicus’ eastern command; he may even have
decided upon the two appointments at the same time, but announced
them separately. Yet by presenting Piso’s appointment as a direct consequence of the prince’s extraordinary command, Tacitus gives the reader
the distinct impression that a conspiracy existed against the prince.
Tacitus tries to deepen his insinuation of a conspiracy by suggesting as a motive that Tiberius was jealous and fearful of Germanicus, and,
therefore, the emperor needed Piso to control and possibly kill the prince,
but this too is baseless. Tiberius had no obvious motive for distrusting
or conspiring against his stepson.17 It is true that Germanicus had represented the greatest potential threat to Tiberius’ succession upon Augustus’
death, but the prince had dispelled all suspicion by making a powerful
and public show of loyalty to his uncle. When the legions in Germany
offered to make Germanicus emperor following Augustus’ death, the
prince adamantly defended his uncle’s rights, bound his supporters in
an oath to support the emperor, and successfully brought the loyalty
of the legions back to Tiberius (Tac. Ann. 1.31.1, 34.1–35.4, and 42.1–4).

16
Dabrowa 1998, 17–30, points out that Silanus’ immediate predecessors had only
served two or three years as governor.
17
Martin 1981, 141, points out, “There is no indication in Tacitus or anywhere else
that Tiberius’ behaviour was motivated by regard or fear of either Germanicus or Drusus,”
and Goodyear 1981 states clearly about Tiberius’ decision to send Piso as the governor
of Syria under Germanicus: “there is no reason to see anything sinister here, and much
of T.’s innuendo can be stripped away forthwith.” See also Mierow 1943, who argues that
Tacitus deliberately misrepresented Tiberius as being hostile to Germanicus, and Seager
2005, 82–83, who argues that Tiberius wanted to honor Augustus’ wish that Germanicus
should be seen as Tiberius’ heir.
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Furthermore, Germanicus had sacrificed his own desire for personal glory
in a significant demonstration of his loyalty to Tiberius; although he very
much wanted to continue his German campaigns, he abandoned them
and returned to Rome in obedience to his uncle’s summons (Tac. Ann.
2.26.1–5). Tiberius’ confidence in his stepson was demonstrated by the
many honors he showered on the prince: he gave Germanicus a triumph
for his campaigns over the Germans, he gave the urban population a
large donative in the prince’s name, he designated Germanicus to be his
consular colleague in the next year, and he requested an extraordinary
eastern command for the prince (Tac. Ann. 2.41.2–43.1).18 The SCPP not
only stresses the emperor’s affection for the prince but also portrays
these two men as united against the arrogant insubordination of Piso.19
Although Germanicus would later offend Tiberius by entering Egypt
without the emperor’s permission, the emperor’s castigation of him for
this was surprisingly mild considering the seriousness of the offense (Egypt
was strictly forbidden to all of Rome’s senatorial aristocracy, Tac. Ann.
2.59.1–3).20 Nor was Germanicus’ military glory and popularity with the
legions a source of concern to Tiberius, who had himself been the hero
of those legions when he had served as Augustus’ leading general on the
German frontier (Suet. Tib. 9.1–2, 16.1–19.1; Tac. Ann. 2.26.3). Tiberius
had been Augustus’ loyal lieutenant and heir, and he knew the value of a
reliable relative like Germanicus who was content to wait for his turn to
rule. Thus there is little reason to suspect that the emperor was jealous or
fearful of his adopted son, which further undermines Tacitus’ innuendo
that Piso was selected to thwart Germanicus.
While modern scholars generally disregard Tacitus’ suggestion that
Tiberius wanted to have Germanicus killed, it is widely accepted—despite

18
Goodyear 1981, 2.325, and Seager 2005, 82–84, suggest that Tiberius may have
feared that the eastern legions would become too loyal to the charismatic young prince, but
Germanicus was not being sent to conduct military operations; he was, rather, to oversee
economic and governmental reforms, so the time he would spend with the army was intended
to be minimal (as actually was the case). On Germanicus’ activities, see Koestermann 1958.
19
SCPP 29–32, 38–39, 123–27. See also Eck et al. 1996, 166, 181–82, 250; Griffin
1997, 260.
20
Tiberius rebuked Germanicus for his entry into Egypt but took no stronger measures to punish his adopted son for what was really a very serious violation. Of course, we
cannot know what would have happened had Germanicus lived to return to Rome. Contra
Koestermann 1958, 350–53, who sees Germanicus’ trip to Egypt as a sign that conflict was
growing between the prince and his adopted father. Goodyear 1981, 2.378–79, agrees that
Germanicus’ action seems like willful disobedience. For a discussion of the imperial policy
of forbidding senators to enter Egypt without the emperor’s permission, see Drogula 2011.

WHO WAS WATCHING WHOM?

131

the meager evidence—that Piso was sent to Syria in order to keep an eye
on the prince and to prevent him from doing anything rash. This view
is based upon the assumption that Piso was a trusted supporter of the
emperor, and that his loyalty and self-importance made him the ideal
man to have in direct command of the Syrian legions, which Germanicus
would need for any major military operation. Syme’s assessment is typical:
The task demanded a man who, even without benefit of active warfare, had
at least held one of the military provinces. Moreover, not to be overawed
by any prince . . . Tiberius looked for a resolute character and unswerving
loyalty. The old friend was the answer . . . Piso understood the policy of
the ruler and no doubt shared his distrust of Germanicus Caesar. Piso was
appointed to act as an “adiutor” to the prince (Tiberius used that word).
In truth to curb rather than to counsel. Men spoke of “secreta mandata.”
They were right. The function of Caesar’s confidant and mandatory was to
avert embroilment with the Parthians, counter intrigue with Roman vassals,
take a firm grip on the legions in Syria.21

This view represents a partial acceptance of Tacitus’ conspiracy theory:
it accepts that Tiberius and Piso were in cahoots to restrain the actions
of Germanicus in the East, but it stops short of Tacitus’ insistence that
the conspiracy was intended to harm the prince. There are, however,
serious problems with accepting even this modified reading: problems
of logic and reason, problems regarding the nature of the relationship
between Piso and Tiberius, and problems in the history of the relationship between Piso and Tiberius. In the first place, if Tacitus is correct that
Piso was a man who was “temperamentally violent and a stranger to
compliance, with the innate defiance of his father . . . fired by the nobility
and wealth of his wife too . . . he scarcely yielded to Tiberius and looked
down on the man’s children as greatly beneath him” (Ann. 2.43.2–4), it
seems contrary to reason that the emperor would have sent such a man
on a mission that required diplomacy, restraint, and judgment. Piso’s
21
Syme 1986, 373. See also Goodyear 1981, 2.325, who calls Piso “a man the princeps
could hold as a personal friend of firm loyalty”; Shotter 1974, 235, cf. 1968, 205, noted that
“Piso will have seemed an ideal replacement [for Silanus in Syria]; close to Tiberius, experienced, and not likely to be overawed by Germanicus’ authority”; Levick 1999, 154, writes
of Piso that “his abilities may have been mediocre, and his temper ungovernable, but that
fact was outweighed by his closeness to Tiberius and by his seniority. There is no need to
doubt that he was sent to Syria to head Germanicus off from adventures that would not
profit the Empire”; and González 1999, 130, suggests that “Tiberius chose his friend Piso
to accompany Germanicus because, being a man of independent character, he would not
easily submit to the decisions of Germanicus.” See also n. 3 above.
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arrogance and cruelty were well known: Seneca (De ira 1.18.3–6) records
an episode in which Piso had three obviously innocent Roman soldiers
executed simply to satisfy his own pride. Tiberius had had several prior
opportunities to assess Piso’s character (see below), and it is difficult to
believe that the emperor—who was an experienced commander and was
surely concerned for the stability of his empire—would knowingly have
selected such a disruptive and self-centered senator to act as a discreet
and responsible check on Germanicus.22 Not just the emperor, but any
informed senator would have known that Piso was the wrong man for
the job.
Second, Piso’s actions in Syria demonstrate very clearly that he
was no friend and ally to the emperor. Upon taking up his command,
Piso began tampering with the loyalty of the legions by relaxing military
discipline, removing strict officers, promoting those loyal to him, giving
donatives in his own name, allowing soldiers to call him the “parent of
the legions,” and calling some soldiers “Pisonians” and others “Caesarians” (SCPP 45–49, 54–56; Tac. Ann. 2.55.5–6, 3.13.2).23 None of this could
have been pleasing to Tiberius, and it even seems treasonous. Piso then
magnified his disservice to Tiberius by resorting to civil war in his efforts
to reclaim Syria from Germanicus’ lieutenants. Although Piso probably
believed it was within his rights to reclaim his command by force, he must
have known that starting a civil war was contrary to Tiberius’ wishes and
best interests, and this was indeed one of the most serious crimes with
which he was subsequently charged (SCPP 45–48). Tacitus portrays Piso
as solely concerned with his own self-interest in his efforts to recover
the province, and the SCPP says that he believed that his arbitrium
and potestas should direct all affairs in Syria (SCPP 36–37; Tac. Ann.
2.70.1–2, 80.2). Tacitus’ innuendo that Tiberius and Piso were friends is
directly contradicted by his depiction of Piso as giving remarkably little
thought to protecting or promoting the interests of the emperor; Piso is
portrayed as entirely self-motivated, he abandons Syria rather than stay
22
Seager 2005, 83–84, remarks that it was “a situation in which trouble was virtually
bound to arise.” There is no indication that Tiberius was careless in his appointment of
legates; although he is said (Suet. Tib. 42.1) to have appointed Pomponius Flaccus to be the
governor of Syria after a two-day drinking party, Flaccus was an old and trusted friend of
the emperor and an experienced commander, and so—if this story is true—it shows Tiberius
selecting a seasoned, reliable, and capable commander for the important province of Syria.
23
Goodyear 1981, 2.363, points out that the honor of “parent of the legion” was
generally reserved for the emperor at this time, and that Piso was “rash to have acquired
[the title] at all.” See also Lott 2012, 277–79: “these titles [Pisonians and Caesarians] were
evocative of civil war.”
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and attempt to influence the prince, and he takes actions that he surely
knows will be displeasing to the imperial house.24 That Tiberius made no
effort to defend or protect Piso in subsequent prosecution back in Rome
is clear: Tacitus writes of the trial that Tiberius was implacable because
of the civil war Piso had caused, and that the emperor had completely
shut himself off to any possibility of appeal from his legate (Tac. Ann.
3.14.3 and 15.2). While it is possible that Tiberius “abandoned” his loyal
friend to the anger of the senate and people of Rome, the evidence more
strongly suggests that there was no deep friendship between the two to
start with, and that the emperor was enraged at Piso’s actions and was
quite content for the senate to carry out its prosecution.
Third, it is not at all clear how Piso could have restrained Germanicus, who was a popular imperial prince, the great-nephew of Augustus,
a two-time consul, a triumphator who had been sent to the East with
imperium maius and a vast provincia that included Syria, and was
accompanied by loyal friends who supported his wishes and obeyed his
commands even after his death. On what grounds, or with what authority,
could Piso legally or even effectively prevent any action that Germanicus decided to pursue?25 Is it believable that—in any circumstance—the
legions would have chosen to support the proconsul Piso over the imperial
prince Germanicus Caesar, who was invested with imperium maius and
was the heir-apparent of the emperor? Not at all: Piso did everything
in his power to win the affection and loyalty of the Syrian legions, but
when he sought to reclaim the province by force, those legions remained
loyal to Germanicus’ lieutenant rather than side with their governor. In
fact, Piso did not restrain or prevent any of Germanicus’ actions—he
was a great annoyance, but he proved entirely incapable of hindering
the prince in any way. Although on one occasion Piso did refuse to obey
Germanicus’ instruction that he should send a detachment of soldiers
to Armenia (Tac. Ann. 2.57.1), this defiance crumbled when the prince
confronted the governor in person, and Piso quit his province rather than
continue as an underling now proven to be impotent. Simply put: Tiberius
had not given his Syrian governor the power to hinder the prince in any
way. Perhaps the emperor imagined that Piso would guide Germanicus’
24
Syme 1986, 373, calls Piso’s decision to leave Syria in the first place a dereliction
of duty. For a recent discussion of the specific charges made against Piso in his trial, see
Lott 2012, 268–82.
25
Since Piso had no authority at all beyond Syria (Goodyear 1981, 2.323), it is
difficult to imagine how he could have exerted any influence on Germanicus, whose command encompassed the entire East, including Syria. Hurlet 1997, 195–97, even argues that
Germanicus’ imperium maius marked him as a co-regent with the emperor.
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actions through wise counsel, but if so, Piso was very obviously the wrong
choice for this assignment, and Tiberius would have known this given
Piso’s previous behavior (see below). Thus if Piso was sent to restrain
Germanicus’ actions and ambitions, he was woefully ill-equipped for the
task, having absolutely no way to complete this objective.
Thus Piso lacked both the temperament to guide the prince by advice
and the power to control him through force, which seriously undercuts the
notion that he had been sent by the emperor to act as a check or monitor
on Germanicus. The only remaining reason for suspecting that Piso was
an agent of the emperor is the widespread belief that the two men were
close friends (not just shallow, potential allies) and that Tiberius would
not have assigned his proud friend the humiliating task of governing Syria
as a subordinate to Germanicus’ imperium maius unless there had been
a hidden agenda to control the prince. In other words, the assumption
of a close friendship between governor and emperor makes one look
for a deeper motive for Piso’s provincial assignment. As we shall see,
however, the evidence that Piso enjoyed a real friendship with Tiberius
is very meager, whereas there is extensive evidence showing that Piso
was unfriendly and even antagonistic towards the emperor.
Not even Tacitus can bring himself to claim that Tiberius and Piso
were close friends, although doing so would have advanced his efforts
to implicate the emperor in Piso’s crimes. In Tiberius’ address to the
senate at the opening of Piso’s trial, Tacitus has the emperor refer to
Piso as “his father’s legate and friend [who] had been given by himself,
on the senate’s authority, to Germanicus as his helper in the administration of affairs in the East” (patris sui legatum atque amicum Pisonem
fuisse adiutoremque Germanico datum a se, auctore senatu, rebus apud
Orientem administrandis, Ann. 3.12.1). Thus while Tiberius describes Piso
as Augustus’ amicus and Germanicus’ adiutor, he makes no particular
claim of friendship with Piso for himself. This silence is striking: why does
the emperor acknowledge Piso’s friendship with Augustus and not with
himself (if such a friendship existed)? Furthermore, the statement that
Piso and Augustus were friends is itself questionable, or at least should
not be taken as signifying a particularly close bond: Shotter has pointed
out that Piso’s proconsulship of a senatorial province came at the usual
time in his career (that is, no special consideration was given), and that
there was a hiatus of over a decade before he was offered command of
an imperial province.26 In other words, Piso received no obvious benefit
26
Shotter 1974, 231. Syme 1986, 369, points out that Piso does not seem to have reached
the consulship when first eligible, but had to wait a few years. Piso had been proconsul of
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from his supposed friendship with Augustus, which is surprising since
one can imagine that Augustus would have advertised and promoted his
friendship with a nobilis and scion of the Republic like Piso. Furthermore,
Crook and Winterling have both argued that anyone given regular admittance to the imperial salutationes could be counted among the emperor’s
amici, and Suetonius (Aug. 53.2–3, 74.1) says that Augustus welcomed all
senators to his salutationes.27 Taken together, this indicates that practically any senator could have been called an amicus of Augustus, causing
Crook (1975, 25) to caution that: “merely to have shown that a man was
an amicus is not to have discovered in him a counsellor of the emperor.”
Saller (1982, 11–15, 61) also emphasizes that the terms amicus and amicitia
encompassed a very broad range of social relationships, and that most
amici of the emperor probably saw him only at morning salutationes and
at dinner parties. Thus Tiberius’ description of Piso as Augustus’ amicus
does not mean much by itself, and his failure to follow this up with a
statement of his own friendship for Piso contradicts the assumption that
they were true friends.
Similarly, one should not make much of Tiberius’ statement that he
would reject Piso and bar him from the imperial house if he had betrayed
his duties and had rejoiced at the prince’s death (Tac. Ann. 3.12.2). While
this may appear to suggest that Piso previously had enjoyed privileged
access to the emperor, this was not the case. Suetonius (above) has shown
that all senators generally had access to the emperor’s house under
Augustus, and there is no indication that Tiberius immediately deviated
from his stepfather’s practices. Access to the emperor, therefore, was not
the same thing as friendship with the emperor. Since all senators were
received at the imperial house at the time, it was far more significant to
be banned from the imperial presence than it was to have access to him.
This is demonstrated by Tacitus’ report (Ann. 2.70.2) that Germanicus
on his deathbed renounced his friendship with Piso: no one can possibly
imagine that they had been close friends previously, so Germanicus’ renunciation of their friendship was simply a statement of official displeasure.28

Africa sometime between his consulship in 7 b.c.e. and the death of Lucius Caesar in 2 c.e.
(PIR2 C 287; Sen. De ira 1.18.3–6). He was a legatus in Nearer Spain towards the end of
Augustus’ reign (Tac. Ann. 3.13.1).
27
Crook 1975, 21–30; Winterling 1999, 161–94. See also Syme 1956; Hellegouarc’h
1963, 41–51.
28
Rogers 1959, demonstrates that the renunciation of friendship (amicitiam renuntiare)
was a public statement of displeasure and a suspension of friendly intercourse, but it did not
necessarily mean that the two individuals involved had previously enjoyed a close friend-
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Of course, in Tacitus’ version of Piso’s suicide note (Ann. 3.16.3–4), Piso
calls himself Tiberius’ friend and claims that he had been given the honor
of holding the consulship of 7 b.c.e. with Tiberius because Augustus had
approved of him, but this is highly dubious evidence. Not only does Tacitus
confess that his text of Piso’s letter only “roughly” (ferme) followed the
original, but the main purpose of Piso’s note was to implore clemency
for his son, so it should not be surprising that Piso tried to solicit the
emperor’s sympathy by claiming greater friendship and loyalty than was
actually the case.29
Furthermore, the mere fact that Piso and Tiberius were colleagues
in the consulship does not demonstrate any friendship between them. It
would have been Augustus (not Tiberius) who recommended Piso for the
consulship, so any gratitude Piso felt (if there was any) would have been
directed towards the man who arranged the honor, rather than towards
the colleague who shared the honor. There is no reason to think that Piso
and Tiberius were made consular colleagues because they were friends;
political motives generally lay at the heart of consular assignments. In fact,
Piso may not have appreciated being forced to share the consulship with
a man who was (at the time) a lesser member of the imperial house.30 In
7 b.c.e. Tiberius was (at best) third in line of succession to Augustus and
was notoriously on bad terms with the emperor, so the honor of holding
the consulship with him was not nearly as great as sharing office with
the emperor or his appointed heir. Indeed, the self-important Piso may
even have been insulted and angered by having to share his consulship
with Tiberius, since the glory and attention Piso received as consul were
probably much less than that given to his better-connected colleague. To
someone like Piso, who was so proud of his own lineage that he “scarcely
yielded” to the emperor (Tac. Ann. 2.43.3–4), sharing a consulship with an
imperial prince may have been an unattractive “honor” because it meant
being overshadowed during the pinnacle of his career.
Finally, although Syme (quoted above) draws attention to the fact
that Piso is called the “helper” (adiutor) of Germanicus (SCPP 29; Tac.
ship. He gives (227) a particularly good example (Quint. Inst. 6.3.79): “Gaius Proculeius,
brother-in-law of Maecenas, forbade his home to Cassius Severus, the a cid-tongued orator; Severus made public reply, ‘I never go there anyway, do I?’” See also Lott 2012, 266.
29
Even Bird 1987, 74—who accepts that Piso and Tiberius were friends—points out
that the amicitia referred to in Piso’s letter may have been only a political alliance and not
a true affectionate friendship.
30
Rapke 1982, 62, looks at several examples and argues: “sharing a consulship with
a son (or stepson in the case of Tiberius and Piso) of the Princeps conferred no special
distinction or promise of favour or advancement.”
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Ann. 3.12.1), this in itself says nothing about the nature of Piso’s relationship with Tiberius, nor does it demonstrate that Piso was sent to Syria as
a special advisor to the prince. The word adiutor is provocative because
it was occasionally used to describe the emperor’s most senior allies and
lieutenants (such as Agrippa, Statilius Taurus, and Sejanus), but this circle
of men was exceedingly small, and nothing we know about Piso places
him within this most-elite circle (he is not described as the emperor’s
adiutor, merely the prince’s).31 In the late Republic, the term adiutor
had conveyed the simple concept of “helper,” and it eventually came to
signify a range of lesser offices in Rome’s bureaucracy, so the word does
not in itself demonstrate that Piso was a trusted friend and agent of the
emperor.32 While it is true that Augustus had occasionally assigned senior
and experienced men as advisors to accompany young princes on special
commands, such men were generally called rectores, not adiutores.33 Piso
cannot have been such a rector—or any other type of advisor—because
he was assigned to a different province from Germanicus and therefore
was rarely present to give advice. Moreover, Germanicus was a much
more experienced commander than Piso, and he was accompanied by
his own council of advisors, so it seems impossible that Piso had any
official role in Germanicus’ command.34 Thus Syme’s emphasis on the
31
Velleius Paterculus refers to M. Vipsanius Agrippa and Statilius Taurus as adiutores
to Augustus (Vell. 2.127.1); Velleius and Tacitus both refer to L. Aelius Sejanus as an adiutor
to Tiberius (Tac. Ann. 4.7.1; Vell. 2.127.3).
32
Hellegouarc’h 1963, 88–89, and TLL 1.715.5ff. discuss the many different uses of
the term adiutor. Regarding Tacitus’ use of the term at 3.12.1, Woodman and Martin 1996,
141, suggest that adiutor was an official term, but regarding the appearance of the word in
the SCPP, Eck et al. 1996, 157–58, argue “Adiutor bezeichnete eine nicht präzis definierbare
Stellung.” Lott 2012, 272, also points out “there was no regular position of adiutor.” The
word conveyed the abstract meaning of “helper” in the late Republic (Cic. Fam. 1.9.19; Caes.
BC 3.62), and it may have meant nothing more than this here. See also Koestermann 1958,
337; Woodman 1977, 253–54; Goodyear 1981, 2.325; Hurlet 1997, 380–413.
33
When Gaius Caesar had been given a special command in the East in 1 b.c.e.,
M. Lollius was assigned to advise him as comes et rector (Suet. Tib. 12.2) and as moderator (Vell. 2.102.1), and in 2 c.e. he was replaced as rector by Sulpicius Quirinus (Tac. Ann.
3.48.1). Goodyear 1981, 2.325, seems to conflate the adiutor with the titles comes, rector,
and moderator, but he also points out that “Germanicus, of whose sapientia we have just
heard, was no callow youth, like Gaius.”
34
Although Tacitus makes Tiberius refer to Piso as Germanicus’ “helper in the
administration of affairs in the East” ([adiutor] rebus apud Orientem administrandis, Tac.
Ann. 3.12.1), this is probably a misleading statement. Piso was not an adiutor assigned to
the prince’s concilium, but rather a legatus Augusti assigned to the province of Syria. Piso
travelled to the East separately from Germanicus, and once he arrived he is not found in
the company of the prince except when Germanicus entered Syria. Thus Piso had n
 othing
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description of Piso as adiutor to the prince seems to make too much of
the term. If anything, the word was probably invoked by Tacitus and the
SCPP to intensify the appearance of Piso’s guilt: he had been expected
to “help” Germanicus, but instead worked against the prince and rejoiced
at his death.
While there is no good evidence that Piso was a close friend and
agent of the emperor, or that amicus and adiutor were meant to express
such a relationship, there is substantial evidence to suggest that he was
actually antagonistic towards the imperial regime, and to Tiberius in
particular. In the first place, Piso was not merely a senator of consular
status; he belonged to one of Rome’s most prestigious surviving clans
and was immensely proud of his glittering Republican heritage. In the
aftermath of the civil wars that had exterminated so many aristocratic
clans, the Calpurnii Pisones stood out as being one of the oldest and most
“Republican” families that survived.35 A common trait of this family seems
to have been its resistance to dynasts: Piso’s grandfather and great-uncle
had both been fierce opponents of Caesar and Pompey, and his father
had been a strong supporter of Brutus and Cassius.36 As Cooley (1998,
203) has pointed out: “the immediate family of Piso pater had a history
of causing trouble for the powers at Rome.” Piso’s father had returned
to Rome after the defeat of Brutus and Cassius and the collapse of the
Republican cause, but he shunned the dynasts and rebuffed overtures
from Augustus until long after the Battle of Actium. This Piso relented
only eight years later, eventually accepting Augustus’ invitation that they
hold the consulship jointly in 23 b.c.e. (Tac. Ann. 2.43.2). Syme is surely
right that this Piso only accepted the emperor’s offer because it served
to do with Germanicus’ eastern command except that he—like all eastern provincial
governors—was expected to obey the prince’s imperium maius if it was imposed upon him
(see Eck et al. 1996, 157).
35
For a history of the Calpurnii Pisones, see Earl 1960; Forsythe 1994, 1–24; HofmannLöbl 1996.
36
Piso’s great-uncle (C. Calpurnius Piso, cos. 67 b.c.e.) strongly opposed the lex
Gabinia and refused to allow Pompey to recruit men and resources in Piso’s province of
Cisalpine Gaul, despite the fact that the lex Gabinia specifically authorized Pompey to do
so (Dio 36.24.3, 37.2; Plut. Pomp. 25.4, 27.2). Furthermore, in the debate over the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 b.c.e., this Piso was said to have begged Cicero to implicate Caesar
(falsely) in the conspiracy (Sall. Cat. 49.2; Plut. Caes. 7.3). Gruen 1974, 60, 66, 80, 286, discusses this Piso’s opposition to Pompey and Caesar. Cn. Piso’s grandfather went to Spain
in 65 b.c.e. as quaestor pro praetore to reduce the influence of Pompey in that province
(Sall. Cat. 19.1–5; CIL 12 2.749 = ILS 875; see Seager 2002, 65–66). Cn. Piso’s father chose
the side of Brutus and Cassius over Caesar (Tac. Ann. 2.43.2).
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his own ends: after his long retirement and refusal to cooperate with the
imperial regime, he accepted a joint consulship with the emperor in order
to refurbish the dignitas of his family and secure consulships for his two
sons.37 The promotion of the gens Calpurnia from plebeian to patrician
status may have been part of the price the emperor paid to acquire this
Piso’s public support.38 Augustus wanted to heal a state that had long
been fractured by civil war, but he also needed the senatorial elite—and
most particularly the surviving nobiles—to accept and support his regime,
and he could use his extensive resources to induce these important men
to join him. As Syme notes (1939, 368): “the master of patronage could
attach to his cause even the most recalcitrant of the nobiles.” A personal
offer from the emperor to share the consulship of 23 b.c.e. enabled Piso’s
father to renew and increase the prestige and importance of his family,
but this need not indicate that he felt any friendship or loyalty towards
the imperial house, nor does it necessitate that his son would have felt
any gratitude or friendship towards Augustus’ stepson Tiberius.
Piso (cos. 7 b.c.e.) seems to have inherited his family’s fierce
Republicanism and hostility towards the imperial regime. Not only does
Tacitus describe him as “temperamentally violent and a stranger to
compliance, with the innate defiance of his father” (Ann. 2.43.2–3), but
also he records Piso’s challenging Tiberius publicly on several occasions,
demonstrating little regard or gratitude for Augustus’ promotion of his
father. Furthermore, Piso undermined the emperor with this defiance at
a time when Tiberius was new to imperial rule and needed to consolidate
his position. In 15 c.e., when Tiberius was incensed at the allegation that
Granius Marcellus had (among other things) removed Augustus’ head
from statues and replaced it with an image of Tiberius, the emperor
declared that he would express his own opinion openly and on oath,
knowing that this would compel the other senators to agree with him
and convict Marcellus (Ann. 1.74.1–6). In response, Piso embarrassed
the emperor by objecting that his tremendous influence over the cowed
senators would prevent them from voting freely, a clear statement that
the emperor’s participation would subvert justice. Tacitus calls Piso’s defiance a reminder of dying liberty (vestigia morientis libertatis) and says
that Tiberius, shaken (permotus) by the challenge, allowed Marcellus to
be acquitted of the charge of treason (although he still had to answer a
37
Syme 1984, 368. Syme elsewhere (1939, 368) suggests that Piso may have accepted
out of “disinterested patriotism.”
38
Syme 1939, 382, n. 9.
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charge of extortion).39 For Piso to rebuff the emperor in this way, publicly
before the senate, and to prevent him from speaking when he clearly
wanted to, does not seem the act of a friend and ally.
Piso openly challenged the emperor a second time the following year
(16 c.e.) when he pushed the senate to reject Tiberius’ wish that all citizens
practicing astrology should be exiled from the city (Dio 57.15.7–9). In
direct opposition to Tiberius and Drusus, Piso urged the senate to protect
these citizens, and his motion carried the day against the emperor until
a tribune interposed his veto to prevent any interference with Tiberius’
wishes. Piso’s defiant opposition surprised Dio, who called this challenge
to imperial authority a particularly good demonstration of democratic
government (τὸ τῆς δημοκρατίας σχῆμα).40 In that same year, Piso showed
his disregard for Tiberius a third time. When the emperor announced
that he would be absent from the senate for a period in the near future,
Piso insisted that public business in the senate should continue in spite of
Tiberius’ absence, and argued against those who believed the emperor’s
presence was necessary for the senate’s distinction and dignity (Tac. Ann.
2.35.1–2). Tacitus thought that this public show of scorn for the emperor
was striking, and he referred to it as an unusual example of free speech
under the imperial regime (species libertatis).41 While any one of these
public challenges to the emperor might be explained away,42 three such
challenges in rapid succession do not seem the work of a friend and ally.
39
Because Shotter 1974, 233, accepts that Tiberius and Piso were friends, he dismisses
this as an unimportant event and believes the emperor was neither angry nor resentful, but
this seems difficult to accept given the public nature of the rebuke, and given that it came
so early in Tiberius’ reign when he was particularly vulnerable to criticism.
40
Bird 1987, 73, seems to agree that Tiberius was displeased with the decisive independence of the senate in this matter, although he cautions that the emperor would have
been displeased with more senators than just Piso on this occasion.
41
To reconcile this episode with his assumption that Piso and Tiberius were friends,
Shotter 1974, 233, suggests that Piso was actually championing Tiberius’ own feelings that
the senate should not adjourn in his absence, in which case it seems strange that Tiberius—
who was present during the debate—did not indicate this preference that would have given
honor to the senate as an independent body. Bird 1987, 73, suggests Tiberius did not speak
because he was new as emperor and wanted free debate in the senate, which is possible (if
based upon a guess at what Tiberius was thinking) but does not diminish the fact that Piso
was openly arguing for the emperor’s insignificance to senatorial activity.
42
Shotter 1974, 234, tries to explain Piso’s actions differently, seeing him “as a frank
and firm senator, whose standing with Tiberius was such that he could speak up without
incurring wrath,” but this depends entirely upon the tenuous assumption that the two men
were actually close enough as friends that the emperor could forgive such public affronts.
As argued above, however, there is no good evidence for their friendship, and Piso’s actions
seem quite antagonistic: he had repeatedly challenged Tiberius in public before the senate,
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Tiberius, therefore, cannot have been under the illusion that Piso
was his friend and supporter. Just one year before Piso was assigned to
Syria, his brother L. Calpurnius Piso “Augur” (cos. 1 b.c.e.) had publicly
condemned the state of public affairs and tried to quit the senate in
disgust, forcing the still-new emperor Tiberius to entreat the prestigious
nobilis not to abandon the government altogether (Tac. Ann. 2.34.1).43
Smarting from this embarrassment, the emperor could not reasonably
expect that L. Calpurnius Piso’s brother was a loyal friend to the imperial regime. Not only had Cn. Piso insulted Tiberius before the senate;
his first recorded action after accepting the governorship of Syria was to
undermine the authority of the imperial regime by scolding Germanicus
before the Athenians, and he later berated the Nabataeans for presenting
Germanicus with regal honors by complaining that the prince was “the
son of the Roman princeps, not that of the Parthian king” (Tac. Ann.
2.57.4).44 Taken altogether, there seems to be ample evidence that Piso
was no loyal friend and supporter of the emperor, and the only suggestion to the contrary appears in the unverifiable rumors that Tacitus puts
into the mouths of others. Given the clear evidence of Piso’s resentment
and opposition to Tiberius, it seems unsound to accept Tacitus’ innuendo
that the two men were friends and allies; the unfriendliness that Tacitus
reports as fact should be given more credence than the friendship that
is only reported through rumor and inference. If anything, Piso was
ideologically opposed to the imperial regime and deeply resentful that
an aristocrat of his lineage and prestige had to show deference to men
like Tiberius and Germanicus. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Tiberius
would have been so foolish as to think he could trust Piso, especially with
the command of heavily armed Syria and the extremely sensitive task of
watching and restraining Germanicus.
This brings us back to the original conundrum: since Piso was
neither a friend nor an agent of the emperor, and since he could not
have acted as a restraining force on Germanicus even if this task had
been assigned to him, why was he entrusted with the prestigious and
strategically critical province of Syria? If we remove the misdirection
caused by Tacitus’ innuendo of a conspiracy, a more likely explanation
and he had done so in the early years of Tiberius’ reign when it was essential for the new
emperor to consolidate his position and gather support and receive deference in the senate.
43
Allen 1948 points out a tradition among the Calpurnii Pisones of retreating from
public service when confronted with a tyrannical government.
44
Goodyear 1981, 2.370, calls Piso’s outburst “anachronistic . . . as well as grossly
offensive.”
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is at hand that fits our evidence better: Tiberius may have offered Piso
the Syrian command as part of a political deal to win over the support
of the troublesome senator. Tiberius had good reasons to do this: he was
still relatively new to imperial rule at the time and faced the challenge of
being the first person to “inherit” the principate (his mother Livia had
been sufficiently worried about his succession that she had suppressed
news of Augustus’ death and posted guard detachments), he was less
popular than his predecessor, the northern legions had revolted upon
his accession, several senators had questioned the handling of his succession, and aristocratic sentiment remained bad enough that in 16 c.e.,
L. Calpurnius Piso “Augur” (Cn. Piso’s brother) attempted to abandon
public life altogether in protest of the poor state of public affairs, which
forced the emperor to take the embarrassing step of beseeching L. Piso
to remain in Rome and continue to attend senate meetings, lest the
retirement of so prestigious an aristocrat be taken as a rebuke of the
emperor’s rule.45 Tiberius, therefore, had good reasons to shore up his
support among Rome’s aristocracy, and winning over Cn. Piso with a
considerable beneficium such as command of the province of Syria was a
shrewd idea. Piso was a blueblood from the Republic, and his dignitas and
ancestral heritage made him a most desirable ally for the new emperor,
especially if it meant silencing Piso’s defiant comments in the senate. In
doing this, Tiberius was adopting Augustus’ tactic of incorporating recalcitrant senators, especially from the among the Calpurnii Pisones: not only
had Augustus convinced Piso’s father to share the consulship with him
in 23 b.c.e., but much more recently—perhaps only a few years before
his death in 14 c.e.—he had persuaded L. Calpurnius Piso “Pontifex”
to lend his famous name and ancestral dignitas to the imperial regime
in exchange for considerable inducements.46 This had been a significant
coup for Augustus, who thereafter paraded the prestigious nobilis as a
prominent ornament of his regime.47 Tiberius understood very well the
value of the Calpurnii Pisones to the regime, which is why he had gone
to great lengths to prevent the senator L. Piso “Augur” from carrying out
his threat to abandon public life. Indeed, this process of winning back

45
Tac. Ann. 1.5.3–4 (Livia), 1.31.1 (revolt), 1.12.1–13.6 (senators), and see above on
L. Calpurnius Piso “Augur.”
46
Syme 1939, 373.
47
In particular, Augustus appointed L. Piso urban prefect (praefectus urbi), a Republican office that Augustus had revived periodically during his rule, but one that became
permanent with L. Piso’s appointment at an unknown date (Tac. Ann. 6.11.3). See Syme
1939, 403–4.
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one brother (L. Piso) may have given Tiberius the idea to offer the other
brother (Cn. Piso) a great province in the hopes of binding him to the
imperial house, or Piso “Augur” may have requested a great command
for his brother as part of his agreement to remain in public life.48 Tiberius
had still other reasons for thinking that Cn. Piso was a good choice for
recruitment: his kinsman L. Calpurnius Piso “Pontifex” still served as
urban prefect and was a loyal supporter of the regime (and a particular
friend of Tiberius), and Cn. Piso’s wife Plancina was a close friend of
Tiberius’ mother, the empress Livia. All these factors, therefore, probably
convinced Tiberius that it was worth his time to try and win over Piso
with the offer of a great command, since doing so could silence his most
pernicious critic and add a prestigious nobilis to his list of supporters.
The offer of Syria was quite an inducement, since most Roman
senators would hope in vain for such a province. Perhaps the greatest command in the empire, the governor of Syria commanded a huge
army of four legions—twice the size of the normal consular army in the
Republic—and it offered the real possibility of winning military glory if
the Parthians attacked. Furthermore, this command was in the Greek
East, a favorite locale among Rome’s aristocracy for its many historic
and luxurious cities. In addition, Syria was far away and communication
between Rome and Antioch was difficult and dependent upon sailing
conditions, which ensured that the commander of Syria could expect to
enjoy considerable independence. Because of its many military resources
and advantages, Syria was rarely entrusted to any senator of great lineage
and auctoritas unless the emperor had a compelling reason for doing so.49
In fact, the only two great nobiles known to have held command of Syria
had linked themselves with the imperial house: the urban prefect L. Calpurnius Piso “Pontifex” and Germanicus’ in-law Q. Metellus Creticus
Silanus.50 Whereas these two nobiles were known to be loyal supporters
48
Saller 1982, 74–78, demonstrated the tendency of emperors in the early empire to
allow their supporters to “broker” imperial beneficia to further increase their support among
the aristocracy. Thus an emperor might bind an ally more tightly to himself by allowing
that ally to suggest other ways the emperor might hand out beneficia.
49
Augustus had normally employed “new men” or men from lesser senatorial families
as legates for Syria because they lacked the requisite dignitas and auctoritas to challenge his
preeminence in Rome and his hold over the legions, as Dabrowa 1998, 17–32, points out: L.
Licinius Varro (gov. ca. 25–23 b.c.e.); M. Titius (gov. ca. 13. 10 b.c.e.); C. Sentius Saturninus
(gov. ca. 10. 7 b.c.e.); Quinctilius Varus (gov. ca. 7. 4 b.c.e.); L. Volusius Saturninus (gov. ca.
4–6 c.e.); and P. Sulpicius Quirinius (gov. ca. 6 c.e.).
50
L. Calpurnius Piso’s governorship of Syria is disputed but likely (see Syme 1986,
337–41).

144

FRED K. DROGULA

of the imperial house, Tacitus makes it very clear that Cn. Piso was no
friend of the emperor before his appointment to Syria. If anything, Piso
had been one of the emperor’s most outspoken critics in the early years
of his rule, so Tiberius’ decision to appoint him to Syria must mean that
the two men came to some understanding about Piso’s future support for
the regime, or at least the emperor believed they had come to such an
understanding. Although no source confirms that this was the emperor’s
intention, there is much to recommend this reconstruction, whereas Tacitus’ innuendo that Tiberius and Piso were close friends and were united
in a conspiracy against the popular young prince is easily disproven by
Tacitus’ own narrative.
If there was indeed a secret plan between Tiberius and Piso, therefore, it probably had nothing to do with Germanicus, but rather was an
agreement that—in exchange for the command of Syria—Piso would
cease from public criticism of the emperor. Despite his previous hostility
towards the imperial house, there were several reasons why Piso would
accept this deal. First, since command of Syria was rarely given to a
great nobilis, receiving this province would enhance Piso’s status and
dignitas even higher above his senatorial rivals. Second, since Syria was
far off in the East, Piso would substantially be his own master once he
assumed command in the province. Since Syria was an imperial province, Piso would technically be a lieutenant of the emperor (a legatus
Augusti pro praetore) rather than an independent governor of a public
province (a proconsul), but this distinction waned in light of the great
power and prestige that came from holding Syria. Third, Tiberius took the
strange and apparently unique step of increasing the honor and prestige
of Piso’s commission by having it confirmed by the Senate (Tac. Ann.
3.12.1).51 The emperor certainly did not need the approval of the senate
to appoint legates to his provinces, so he probably intended to give Piso
the satisfaction of receiving his command from the senate, which might
have soothed any discomfort the proud senator had about being a legatus
Augusti pro praetore instead of a proper proconsul.52 Indeed, the highly
unusual senatorial confirmation may have been intended to obfuscate the
51
Woodman and Martin 1996, 141, point out that this is the only occasion in Tacitus’
Annals where an emperor seeks a senatorial decree appointing an imperial legate, although
it cannot be known whether Tacitus was following an official report (such as the SCPP) or
whether he added the phrase on his own. They note that the phrase may be intended to imply
that the senate shared responsibility for the debacle that resulted from Piso’s governorship.
52
Augustus used lieutenants (legati) with the title pro praetore to govern imperial
provinces, whereas the senate appointed proconsuls (ex-praetors and ex-consuls acting pro
consule) to command the public provinces (Suet. Aug. 47.1; Strabo 17.3.25; Dio 53.12.4–5).
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line between legate and proconsul. Finally, if Piso were even considering
the possibility, Syria offered the best opportunity and resources to raise
a revolt against Tiberius and his regime.
This last possibility may have been in Tiberius’ mind as well. The
chance of gaining the support of a nobilis like Piso was a tempting prize
for Tiberius, but it was also a risk to give such a powerful province to a
prestigious senator whose loyalty to Tiberius was uncertain. A man of
Piso’s lineage and auctoritas might win over the support of Syria’s legions
and start a revolt, especially since Tiberius was a new emperor, was far
away, and was not as well known to the eastern legions as he was to those
stationed in Germany.53 Piso was an asset worth acquiring, and his many
connections with the imperial family surely gave Tiberius hope that the
recalcitrant senator could (like other members of his clan) be brought
around to supporting the regime. Even so, the cautious Tiberius probably
would not have taken the risk of giving Piso unrestrained access to Syria’s
four legions had not administrative problems in several eastern provinces
presented him with a safeguard. According to Tacitus (Ann. 2.42.4–43.1),
a number of high-level problems in the East required the presence of a
member of the imperial house: Cappadocia needed to be converted into
a Roman province; the deaths of the kings of Commagene and Cilicia
had created local disputes over whether the regions should remain independent kingdoms or should be incorporated into the Roman Empire as
provinces; Syria and Judaea were asking for tax relief; and the unstable
political situation in Armenia needed to be monitored and evaluated.
Tiberius, therefore, had the senate give Germanicus an extraordinary
command over the East with imperium maius to deal with these problems,
which was in keeping with precedents established by Augustus. In one
aspect, however, Tiberius departed from Augustan policy: he kept Piso as
his legate in Syria. When Augustus had given Agrippa (and later, Gaius)
extraordinary eastern commands, he had not appointed a legate to Syria.54
Presumably, immediate supervision and command of Syria was part of
the provincia assigned to Agrippa (and Gaius), which makes sense given
that Syria was the most powerful province in the Roman East. Tiberius
broke with this practice by having Piso as his legate in Syria at the same
53
Tiberius is not known to have exercised personal command over the eastern legions
for thirty-six years, since his Armenian campaign in 20 b.c.e. (Suet. Aug. 21.3; Tib. 9.1).
Cooley 1998, 203, suggests that Piso may indeed have secretly hoped to seize power at Rome.
54
See Rowe 2002, 165. Agrippa was sent to the East in 23 and 16 b.c.e. (Jos. Ant.
15.10.2, 16.2.1–5; Dio 53.32.1), and Gaius Caesar in 1 b.c.e. (Plin. HN 6.141; Suet. Tib. 12.2;
Dio 55.10.18–19).
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time that Germanicus was holding an extraordinary eastern command.
Rowe (2002, 165) points out that this was the first and last time until
63 c.e. that an emperor appointed a legate to Syria while an extraordinary commander was holding the entire East with imperium maius. It
is possible that—because Piso had already received his appointment by
the time that Germanicus was assigned to the East—Tiberius did not
want to insult Piso by withdrawing or postponing his Syrian command,
but if this was the case, then the overlap of Piso and Germanicus in the
East was simply an accidental occurrence, which does not seem likely
given the importance of the two commands (and the two commanders).
Tiberius (a very experienced commander) certainly took both provincial
assignments into consideration, so his departure from Augustan practice
must have been intentional; he wanted Germanicus and Piso to be in the
East at the same time.
The traditional view would say Tiberius sent both men to the East
because he wanted Piso to control and limit Germanicus’ ambitions, but
as the preceding pages have shown, the evidence clearly demonstrates
that Piso was no friend and ally to the emperor, that he had no authority
or ability to control the prince, and that he consistently acted contrary to
the emperor’s best interests. In this light, Tiberius must have sent both
men to the East because he wanted Germanicus to keep an eye on Piso.
The evidence supports this reconstruction well, in particular the nature
of their assignments. Although Germanicus was given a command that
encompassed all eastern provinces, the specific problems he was sent to
resolve were almost entirely outside of Syria, meaning he was expected
to spend most of his time away from Syria and from Piso. Furthermore,
since Germanicus’ responsibilities were mainly financial and organizational, there was little reason to suspect that he would have to interfere
in Piso’s command of Syria’s legions (although he had the authority to
do so). This separation in their assignments is telling: Piso could not
possibly have interfered in Germanicus’ exercise of authority, since the
prince had imperium maius and Piso had no authority outside of Syria.
On the other hand, Germanicus could easily intervene into Piso’s administration of Syria and his command of the Syrian legions, both because
he had imperium maius, and because his provincia included Syria. Thus
Germanicus was expected to spend most of his time outside of Syria
(allowing Piso autonomy of command), but he was well placed (and
authorized) to intervene in Syria, whereas Piso had little ability to have
an influence on the prince’s command. This was an elegant solution for
Tiberius: he could honor Piso with an important command, send Germanicus to resolve important problems throughout the East, and—if Piso’s
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activities turned seditious—the emperor could count on his adopted son
and heir to defend the imperial house (and his own future empire) from
any threat. This is indeed what happened: Germanicus endured Piso’s
rude behavior so long as it posed no real threat to the imperial house,
but the prince did not hesitate to step in when Piso’s activities became
potentially treacherous.55 With a loyal relative and heir in command of
the East to keep an eye on things, Tiberius could safely offer Piso the
large and prestigious military command of Syria in hopes of winning the
support of this persistent critic.
The importance and prestige of Syria, and the honor of receiving
the imperial province with senatorial confirmation, induced Piso to accept
the command, but the subsequent news that Germanicus would receive
an extraordinary command over the East must have come as a bitter pill.
Piso probably consoled himself that Germanicus’ mission was primarily
financial and would force the prince to spend almost all of his time reviewing tax systems and administrative structures in provinces other than Syria,
but the legate was no doubt angry at this development and soon began
lashing out against the prince. There is no evidence that Germanicus was
expected to assume command of Syria’s legions for military activities,
and Piso may have expected the prince to spend his leisure time touring
the luxurious cities throughout the East (as he in fact did).56 Thus Piso
probably hoped (or even expected) to be left alone in his command of
Syria, and planned to ignore Germanicus’ presence in the East as much
as possible. Of course, his hope of having a free rein was later crushed
when the prince did indeed appear in the province, and Piso’s anger over
the development led him to be more and more insubordinate, throwing
fuel on his already-strained relationship with Germanicus.
Sending Germanicus to keep an eye on Piso was a good idea, but
events proved that the two men were incapable of working together,
and their differences became insurmountable. Tacitus portrays this as
being entirely Piso’s fault: the Syrian governor had always resented the
young prince, and this resentment turned into the open hostility and
gross insubordination discussed above. On the other hand, it is also
likely that Germanicus did not tread as carefully as he might have done
55
Tac. Ann. 2.57.3, 2.69.1. Goodyear 1981, 2.367, notes that Germanicus’ mild reply
to Piso at their first unfriendly encounter (Tac. Ann. 2.57.2) may indicate that the prince
was uncertain about how the emperor wished the legate treated.
56
Germanicus did indeed spend much time touring Asia and Egypt (Tac. Ann.
2.54.1–55.3). Mierow 1943, 146, points out that Germanicus was expected to spend most
of his time in Armenia.
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to protect Piso’s honor and dignitas. Although Germanicus was loyal
to the emperor, he was probably unwilling or unable to tolerate Piso’s
arrogant behavior, and he did not allow Piso unimpeded exercise of
authority in Syria, either because the prince’s official duties necessitated
that he operate to some degree in that province, or because he wished to
humble the haughty governor. Still, Germanicus was surprisingly tolerant
of Piso’s outbursts, perhaps because he was aware of Tiberius’ motive
for assigning Piso to Syria and, therefore, did his best to tolerate Piso’s
insults in the knowledge that doing so helped his adoptive father gain
the support of an important nobilis.57 Germanicus’ friends were outraged
by Piso’s disrespectful and insubordinate behavior and sought to have
him humbled, but the prince refrained from doing so for a long period,
which suggests that he was deliberately showing Piso more indulgence
than could normally be expected for one who treated an imperial prince
so insolently (Tac. Ann. 2.57.4). At some point, however, Germanicus ran
out of patience, perhaps because Piso’s insubordination had expanded
to countermanding Germanicus’ instructions to the legions and to urban
governments in the East.58 These acts may have smacked far more of
treason than of mere personal enmity to Germanicus, who thereupon
took immediate steps to intervene in Piso’s administration and to take
greater control of affairs in Syria.
According to Tacitus (Ann. 2.57.3–58.2, 69.1), Germanicus intruded
into Piso’s dealings with foreign kingdoms (especially Armenia), and
began intervening in the military and civilian affairs throughout Syria.
From Piso’s perspective, these actions were a humiliation that amounted to
being stripped of his command by a young man many years his junior—a
man whom Piso rated as having less dignitas than he.59 When Germanicus’
intrusions proved too much for Piso to bear, he left his province in protest,
no doubt believing that Germanicus had deprived him of his command

57
The SCPP (26–27) praises Germanicus’ patience in the face of Piso’s hostility and
insubordination.
58
There were two occasions when Piso clearly and specifically refused to obey Germanicus or countermanded his orders: in 18 c.e., Piso refused to bring units of the Syrian
legions to Germanicus in Armenia (Tac. Ann. 2.57.1); and in 19 c.e., Piso reversed all of
Germanicus’ acta in Syria while the prince was away in Egypt (Tac. Ann. 2.69.1).
59
As Seager 2005, 88, points out, Piso’s insubordinate action “is comprehensible—it
was after all Piso’s army and Piso’s province—yet pointlessly provocative, since when
Germanicus returned to Syria he could once more overrule Piso, whose chief purpose was
probably just to restore his self-esteem.”
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(Tac. Ann. 2.69.2, 70.2).60 Tacitus obfuscates this detail by including an
otherwise unsubstantiated report that Germanicus ordered Piso out of the
province, but this is contradicted by the SCPP, which specifically blames
Piso for leaving his province (SCPP 48–49; Ann. 2.70.2). The very fact that
Piso abandoned his province to Germanicus is ample evidence that his
primary concern was not to counsel or restrain the prince, but rather to
serve his own interests, which did not necessarily mirror the interests of
the emperor. Indeed, Tacitus may have included the erroneous report that
Piso was ordered out of the province to provide an alternate explanation
for Piso’s departure, one that did not undermine Tacitus’ insinuation that
Piso was supposed to be the friend and agent of the emperor.
Germanicus’ sudden and unexpected death was the catalyst that
turned a bad situation into a debacle, since it induced Piso to start a civil
war in his effort to reclaim command of Syria. This disaster seems to have
shaken Tiberius and changed his policies regarding provincial commands;
whereas he had originally been willing to follow Augustan practice of winning over nobiles like Piso with important commands, henceforth a certain
degree of paranoia entered his provincial policy. For example, the next
legate Tiberius appointed to Syria was Aelius Lamia (in 21/22 c.e.), but
the emperor did not permit Aelius to leave Rome and take up his command in person. For ten years, Aelius remained the governor of Syria, but
he commanded the province from Rome through legates.61 L. Arruntius
was likewise compelled to govern Spain from Rome through legates for
ten years, perhaps because of the large army of three legions stationed
in Spain. Thus Piso’s behavior in Syria had convinced Tiberius to be far
more cautious in assigning military commands, and he adopted a policy
of leaving trusted men in their provinces for long periods, abandoning his
early attempt to use provincial commands to win over new supporters.
Yet the situation might have been far worse if Germanicus and his loyal
lieutenants had not been present in the East to intervene when Piso’s
activities began to seem treacherous. If we set aside the bias and innuendo
60
Goodyear 1981, 2.362–63, makes the unsupported but intriguing suggestion that
Piso may have suffered a mental breakdown. Although there is no evidence for this, it
would certainly help demonstrate the seriousness of Piso’s expectations and his horror at
having those expectations ruined by the interference of Germanicus. It is not difficult to
imagine that Piso’s self-importance made him unable to cope with playing second fiddle
to the young prince. On the other hand, Shotter 2004, 44, suggests that Piso may simply
have been unintelligent.
61
Tac. Ann. 6.27.2–3 (cf. Hist. 2.65.1–2). For further discussion, see Drogula 2011
(esp. 251–52).
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in Tacitus’ account, it does not seem possible that Piso was a loyal supporter, lieutenant, and co-conspirator of the emperor. If Tiberius trusted
anyone in the East, it was Germanicus, whose extraordinary command
may well have included keeping an eye on Piso.
Syme (1986, 341) once noted that Syria was not only a provincial
command of “signal importance,” but further that, “if a prince of the
dynasty went to the eastern lands, the selection of the legate became a
delicate matter.” If Piso was not a loyal supporter of the emperor, and
was not sent to check the ambitions of Germanicus as Tacitus implies,
then why was such an arrogant nobilis and outspoken critic of the imperial regime given the outstanding privilege of holding one of the greatest
military commands in the Roman Empire? The evidence suggests a very
plausible answer: Tiberius hoped to “purchase” Piso’s loyalty and support by giving him the province of Syria. To minimize the risk, Tiberius
gave Piso the province at a time when his trusted and capable adopted
son Germanicus would be holding an extraordinary command in the
East with imperium maius. The prince was sent to the East to resolve a
number of major financial and organizational problems, but his proximity
to Syria provided a safeguard against the possibility of insurrection. The
emperor’s plan to win over the support of Piso failed, but Piso’s effort
to retake Syria by force after Germanicus’ death may indicate that he
did indeed harbor rebellious thoughts, and that the prince had been right
to intervene. In short, Germanicus may have done exactly what Tiberius
expected him to do: keep an eye on Piso and intervene, if necessary, to
protect the security of the Julio-Claudian regime.62
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